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Evaluation and Microenterprise Programs
1. Introduction
This paper reviews evaluations of microenterprise programs that make loans
and/or provide training to help the poor, the unemployed, and recipients of public
assistance to start or to strengthen small businesses. Success stories of microenterprise
abroad have inspired growth in the number of U.S. programs from almost none in the
1980s to more than 340 in 1999 (Langer, Orwick, and Kays, 1999). Federal support has
also grown steadily (Else, 2000). The growth of microenterprise may, however, draw
resources away from other, possibly better, interventions (Howells, 2000).
Is microenterprise a good use of scarce development funds? Scholars disagree.
Raheim (1996a, p. 69) says that evaluations show that programs “create opportunities
for clients to engage in productive self-employment which will restore self-respect,
facilitate self-reliance, and above all transform a condition of dependency to one of self-
sufficiency.” Bates (1997) says that such claims are not yet backed by careful evidence.
Because microenterprise is new in the United States, most evaluations focus on
process—they ask “What happened?” Process evaluation is important (Woller, Wheeler,
and Checketts, 1999), but as the budget for microenterprise grows, evaluations should
also measure impact—they should ask “What benefits were created, and at what cost?”2
Of course, impact evaluation is expensive and difficult. Measures of benefits and
costs—especially in the absence of the intervention—are always incomplete and
imprecise. All evaluations—whether qualitative or quantitative—necessarily rest partly
on subjective judgements. A good evaluation is not one whose conclusions seem
incontrovertible but rather one that is open to review because the logic that derives
conclusions from measurements and assumptions is clear. The goal of rigorous
evaluation is to put everyone “on the same page” so that discussion can focus on
differences in methods of measurement, logic, or assumptions.
Evaluation so far has not shown whether microenterprise programs are
worthwhile. This paper discusses how to improve evaluation through more rigorous
estimation of benefits and costs both with and without the program. The paper
highlights examples that avoid common pitfalls and emphasizes that funders create the
incentives for careful or careless evaluation. As a simple first step toward improvement,
the paper proposes comparing costs with outputs. The insights are applicable not just
for microenterprise but also for evaluation in general.3
2. Rigor
What is rigor? This section argues that evaluations are inevitably subjective but
that rigor constrains excesses. Rigor implies transparency in the evidence, logic, and
assumptions that support conclusions. Rigorous evaluations are susceptible to critique
and thus more likely to be improved.
2.1 All evaluations are subjective
Evaluation compares net benefits with an intervention versus net benefits
without the intervention. Some types of benefits and costs (such as changes in income)
can be quantified. Other types (such as changes in feelings of self-worth) are necessarily
qualitative, but all types should be considered in the final judgement (Plotnick and
Deppman, 1999). Even if all effects could be converted to common units (such as
dollars), the conversion would inevitably involve subjective judgements such as “a year
of life is worth $x” or “people are willing to pay $y to feel this change in happiness”.
Quantification is still useful, not for its own sake but rather because it helps to
make assumptions and judgements explicit. For example, financial benefit-cost analysis
must be explicit about the financial costs and benefits included and must either assume
away non-financial effects or make an explicit qualitative judgement about them.4
2.2. Rigor constrains excess subjectivity
Rigor aims to improve inter-personal reliability. Some subjectivity is inevitable,
but excesses occur when judgements rest on unexamined experience, fuzzy logic, or
implicit assumptions. Subjectivity is non-transparency; opaque or implicit factors lack
inter-personal reliability, and this might let mistakes sneak through (McCloskey, 1998).
The heart of the social-scientific method is not experiments but explicitness.
Objectiveness or subjectiveness inheres not in an effect but rather in its
measurement. Qualitative benefits and costs are unmeasured, unmeasurable, or
measured in units with low inter-personal reliability; quantitative measures have high
inter-personal reliability. Analyses are more rigorous as they depend less on the
experience and judgement of a specific analyst.
Rigorous evaluations measure what they can and then point out the subjectivity
that remains. Often, simply making explicit the factors that influence a judgement
provokes ideas for improvement or spotlights gaps in logic. Rigor whittles away
unneeded subjectivity and highlights unresolved subjectivity.
Evaluations are inevitably subjective to some degree, and this is not bad. Good
subjective judgements, however, are more than mere opinion; they are derived logically
from explicit assumptions. Rigor makes the factors behind a judgement as transparent
to others as to the analysts. This forces analysts to check their work, and it provides a
basis for the type of reasoned discussion that could lead to improvement.5
3. Cost measurement
Evaluations of microenterprise programs often understate costs in that they
ignore opportunity costs, costs borne by participants, and costs of displaced non-
participants. The issue is less that costs are ignored and more that they are implicitly
ignored. Casual readers might mistakenly infer that all costs were measured.
After introducing the major evaluations of U.S. programs, this section discusses
three often-overlooked types of costs. The next section discusses the measurement of
benefits. Even without knowledge of benefits, knowledge of costs is useful.
3.1 Major evaluations
There are four major evaluations of U.S. microenterprise programs. The
first—the Self-Employment Learning Project (SELP)—tracked seven of the oldest and
best-known microenterprise programs (Clark et al., 1999; Edgcomb et al., 1996).
Second, Himes and Servon (1998) analyzed six programs affiliated with Accion
International, the U.S. network with the most clients. Third, the Self-Employment
Investment Demonstration (SEID) followed seven programs targeted to recipients of
public assistance (Raheim and Alter, 1998; Raheim, 1997, 1996a, and 1996b; Friedman
et al., 1995). Fourth, the Unemployment Insurance Self-Employment Demonstration
(UISED) tested the effect of access to microenterprise services for the newly
unemployed (Benus et al., 1995).6
3.2 Opportunity Costs
Resources employed in microenterprise development could have been employed
elsewhere and so have an opportunity cost. Most microenterprise evaluations use
incomplete measures of opportunity costs, or no measures at all.
Suppose an evaluation covers T years and that the net benefit of a dollar in the
best alternative project (the opportunity cost) is r. The standard assumption is that r is
10 percent per year in real terms (U.S. Office of Management and the Budget, 1972).
Let E0 be the resources (equity) in the program at the start of the time frame, let
Pt be the profit (or loss) in year t if the program had paid market prices for its
resources, let Ft be the net funds transferred to the program in year t, and let
=1/(1+r). Present cost as of the start of the time frame is then:
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the difference between the present worth of net funds Ft in year t and in year T. Net
funds Ft include grants in-cash, the market value of grants in-kind, and expenses
avoided due to soft liabilities with below-market interest rates. The third term, 
TPt, is
the present worth of profit from year t in year T. The measure of profit Pt excludes7
grants recorded as revenue, but it includes expenses that would be incurred in the
absence of grants in-kind and soft liabilities.
No major U.S. evaluation measures the present value of costs. UISED and SELP
count costs as funds spent, but they do not discount, adjust for soft liabilities, or
measure grants in-kind. The cost study for SEID is not yet public (Raheim, 1998). The
Accion evaluation did not measure costs.
3.3 Costs for participants
Microenterprise participants experience both benefits and costs. No major
evaluation measures price costs or non-price transaction costs borne by participants.
3.3.1 Price costs
Prices paid by participants include interest and fees for loans and for training.
Evaluations of programs that make loans should measure price costs as the real
monthly effective interest rate—that is, as the inflation-adjusted internal rate of return
(IRR)—on all cash flows associated with a loan. The IRR accounts for the effects of
non-price terms of the loan contract such as the number, frequency, and timing of
installments; deduction of fees from disbursements; term to maturity; and compensating
balances. As a picture of the true cost of debt for borrowers, the IRR is preferred to the
annual percentage rate that lenders must report by law.8
3.3.2 Non-price transaction costs
Both borrowers and trainees incur transaction costs. More difficult to measure
than price costs, transaction costs are often overlooked, but they may swamp price
costs (Adams, 1995). These costs can be seen in terms of money, miles, and minutes:
the out-of-pocket expenses incurred to participate but paid to someone other than the
program, the cost of transport, and the opportunity cost of time.
Transaction costs do not vary much with loan size, so they impinge most on the
poorest because they get the smallest loans. For example, suppose a loan of $1,000 has
a price of zero and is repaid in one installment after one year. The borrower, however,
may be required to take classes, attend monthly meetings, complete a business plan,
and join a joint-liability group. These requirements can take up to 90 hours (Raheim,
1995; Clark and Huston, 1993; Else and Raheim, 1992). If borrowers do not want or
need extra help, the opportunity cost of time can make even a “free” loan quite
expensive. For example, if time is worth $6 an hour, then a $1,000 “free” loan that
consumes 90 hours is equivalent to $1,000 of credit-card debt with an annual price of
$690/$1,000 = 54 percent. Transaction costs matter most for small loans, which is why
credit cards, pay-day loans, pawn shops, and the best microenterprise programs abroad
can charge high interest rates but must provide streamlined service (Caskey, 1994).9
3.4 Displacement costs for non-participants
A microenterprise program may help one small business at the expense of
another (Garfinkle et al., 1992). Because the poor often lack skills and wealth, they
cluster in sectors with low barriers to entry (Bates, 1997). There, competition is high,
profits are low, and one firm’s gain may be another’s loss. Displacement is very difficult
to measure, but it may be as high as half of the net benefits of participants (Bendick
and Egan, 1987). No major U.S. evaluation discusses displacement costs.10
4. Benefit measurement
The previous section argued that evaluations of microenterprise programs have
understated costs. This section argues that they have overstated benefits.
Participants do get positive net benefits from microenterprise programs; if not,
they would drop out. For process evaluations, mere participation may imply success.
From a social perspective, however, the key question is not whether there are benefits,
nor whether net benefits are positive, but rather whether net benefits are so positive
that microenterprise is better than other ways to reach the same goals. Because the
poor are plenty but the funds are few, evaluations should measure not just the sign of
benefits but also the size of both benefits and costs.
Measurement of benefits faces two challenges. First, as discussed in the next
section, participants are observed only with participation, not without. Second, as
discussed in this section, benefits are not observed, so proxies based on output or
outcomes are used. Issues with these proxies include the proper units, aggregation,
absolute versus relative measures, and a one-sided focus on positive outcomes.
4.1 Units
4.1.1 Jobs
The output of microenterprise programs is often measured in units of “jobs
created”. Not all jobs, however, are created equal. The best convention is to measure
full-time equivalents. No major evaluation does this. For example, SEID reports the11
total number of self-employed participants, whether high-paid, low-paid, full-time, or
part-time. This overstates benefits because most self-employment is low-paid and part-
time (Spalter-Roth, Hartmann, and Shaw, 1993).
Some evaluations count as “strengthened” or “saved” all jobs in businesses owned
by participants (Clark and Huston, 1993). Without knowing what would have happened
without the program, these numbers do not mean much.
4.1.2 Stocks and flows
Some work fails to distinguish between stocks and flows. For example, two
censuses of U.S. programs (Langer, Orwick, and Kays, 1999, and Severens and Kays,
1997) report average loan sizes and numbers of borrowers but do not say whether these
are loans disbursed or loans outstanding. Failure to distinguish stocks and flows allows
programs to report the largest number.
This also matters for training. For example, the average program in 1999
“served” 202 people, most of whom were trainees (Langer, Orwick, and Kays, 1999).
The flow of trainees in a year likely exceeds the stock at any point. (Furthermore, the
number of trainees “served” likely exceeds the number graduated.) The right unit
depends on the question asked, but units should always be reported.
4.1.3 Business starts
Some evaluations report the number of business starts as if firms sprang to life
all at once. This is too simple for three reasons. First, participants may join programs12
with a business already open. Second, drop-outs may still start businesses. Third, most
new ventures (53 percent) fail within four years (Berger and Udell, 1998). As explained
by Raheim et al. (1996, p. 93), “starting a business is a process rather than an event”,
so evaluations should track progress through a series of landmarks such as a business
plan, legal establishment, the start of work, and survival through time.
4.1.4 Income
Income measures have three common weaknesses. The first is to report not
changes but levels. Levels overstate benefits unless income is zero without the program.
The second common weakness is to report income instead of returns. Returns
account for time worked and capital invested. Bates (1997) and Drury et al. (1994) do
report returns. Bates computes profit per hour of owner labor and deducts a 10-percent
return to capital. Drury et al. (1994) report not just average profits of $1,200 per month
but also average returns on owner labor of $6.70 per hour. This figure is useful because
it can be compared with the $12.41 per hour earned before unemployment and with the
$10.55 per hour earned by participants in parallel job-training programs.
The third common weakness is failure to define income. Himes and Servon
(1998) state that self-employment income might be seen as revenue, revenue less
expenses, owner’s draw, or change in retained earnings. In fact, the correct measure is
business profit before taxes and before owner’s draw. Some evaluations report business
revenue, perhaps because it is higher than income. For example, Raheim (1996a)13
reports an average “income” in SEID of $21,000 even though, according to Servon and
Bates (1998), revenue net of expenses was about $3,000.
4.2 Aggregates and averages
Some evaluations report cumulative flows rather than annual flows. For
example, Langer, Orwick, and Kays (1999) report that the 341 programs in their census
served 250,000 people and made loans for $160 million (average age was 7.5 years).
Cumulative flows mask current performance by mixing it with past performance.
A figure of 250,000 cumulative participants may sound better—but conveys less—than
a figure of 100 participants per program per year.
Aggregation over participants is also contra-indicated. For example, Raheim et
al. (1998) report that total sales were $3.5 million for participants in the programs in
Drury et al. (1994). More useful, if perhaps less impressive, is that income per
participant per year was about $12,000.
4.3 Non-positive measurements
Some evaluations accent the positive and downplay or omit everything else. In
principle, evaluations are not proofs but tests, and evaluators are “agnostic or open-
minded about a project . . . . [They] should neither justify nor act as hatchets” (Nares,
1990, p. 33). In practice, evaluations “routinely cite impressive-sounding, yet very
selective statistics on program success” (Bates, 1996, p. 28).14
4.3.1 Half statistics
A common practice is the “half statistic”. For example, Severens and Kays
(1997) note that 30 percent of participants were low-income; they do not mention that
70 percent were not. A good example that avoids this is Raheim and Alter (1998), who
report the share of participants whose self-esteem grew, fell, or did not change.
4.3.2 Drop outs
 Improvement requires feedback on weaknesses as well as on strengths, but data
on drop-outs are conspicuous in their absence. After all, drop-outs are the simplest way
to evaluate value to participants: they will leave unless they expect positive net
benefits. Measurement of drop-outs is standard for microenterprise abroad (Rosenberg,
2001), but Himes and Servon (1998) is the only U.S. evaluation to discuss drop-outs.
4.3.3 Loan repayment
Evaluations of programs that make loans should analyze repayment. A program
that does not recoup its loans cannot help many poor people and cannot be sure that it
helps the most deserving. Arrears plague many U.S. programs (Bhatt et al., 2001).
The best measure of arrears is aged portfolio at-risk. This is the entire balance of
all loans with any installments overdue, divided by the whole portfolio, and grouped by
the age of the oldest overdue installment. Few evaluations report aged portfolio at-risk.
The measures commonly reported understate the risk of loan losses. For example,
Servon (1996) reports the number of loans overdue. This serves some purposes, but it15
misses the greater risk of larger loans. Payments overdue understates risk because it
ignores that one missed payment signals greater risk for the entire loan balance.
Edgcomb et al. (1996) report recuperation, the ratio of cash received to cash due.
Recuperation usefully measures the rate of loan losses in the past, but it may not reflect
current risk. A quick test for the quality of lending program is whether it routinely
measures repayment, especially aged portfolio at-risk (Moll, 1997).16
5. What would have happened
Impact is what happened with a microenterprise program that would not have
happened without it. The “with” case did happen, so behavior of treatments (eligibles or
participants) can—in principle—be directly measured. The “without” case did not
happen, so behavior cannot be directly measured. The central challenge of evaluation is
the estimation of the counterfactual, behavior in the “without” case (Moffitt, 1991).
UISED estimated the counterfactual carefully and took impact as with-versus-
without; other evaluations took impact as before-versus-after. Before-versus-after allows
direct measurement of a counterfactual (before the program), but it falsely ascribes all
changes to the microenterprise program. With-versus-without is preferred.
5.1 Before-versus-after
Before-versus-after counterfactuals have three problems: they assume that the
program caused all changes, they ignore the self-selection of treatments, and they ignore
the self-selection of survivors. 
5.1.1 Time trends
Microenterprise programs surely affect some outcomes, but they just as surely
are not the sole cause of all outcomes. However, the typical evaluation (e.g., SEID and
SELP) ascribes all income and all business start-ups and expansions to the program.
The (implicit) counterfactual of no microenterprise without the program is unlikely.17
With before-versus-after data, the assumed counterfactual—as always—should
be explicit. Also, the analyst should ask participants about impact. Servon (1996, p. 47)
found that “nearly all the women interviewed had already started or claimed that they
would have started their businesses whether or not [the program] existed.”
5.1.2 Self-selection of participants
People who expect high net benefits are more likely to choose to join a
microenterprise program than people who expect low or negative net benefits. Thus, the
average net benefit for participants probably exceeds the average net benefit for
eligibles, had they participated. This is self-selection bias.
One way to mitigate self-selection bias is to control for differences in observed
traits (for example, sex, education, or work experience) between eligibles who choose to
join and those who do not. Sanders (2000) controls for a few observed traits with data
from SELP and from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Sanders finds much smaller
impacts than Clark et al. (1999), who did not control for any observed traits.
Controlling for observed traits is a useful start, but unfortunately self-selection
also depends strongly on unobserved traits. Because entrepreneurship requires
independent work with high risks, people with unobserved oomph and hustle have the
best chance to succeed and thus have higher expected net benefits. Even with observed
traits constant, differences before-versus-after a microenterprise program are due partly18
to participation and partly to existing spunk and grit. Ignoring the effects of
unobserved traits overstates the effects of the program. Again, this is self-selection bias.
UISED is the only major evaluation to account for self-selection on both
observed and unobserved traits. Except for Raheim and Alter (1998), no major
evaluation controls even for observed traits.
5.1.3 Self-selection of survivors
People with high expected net benefits are more likely to complete a program,
start a business, and keep it open. Expected benefits depend not only on the program
but also on observed and unobserved traits. Thus, before-and-after analyses that credit
programs for all changes in participants who have not dropped out or closed their
businesses overstate impact. This is survivor bias, a type of self-selection bias.
Survivor bias may explain part of the positive link between profits and repeat
loans found by Himes and Servon (1998) for Accion and by Clark and Huston (1993)
for SELP. Servon and Bates (1998) suggest that survivor bias may also explain why
profits in SEID (Raheim, 1996) were three times higher than for self-employed women
in a broader sample studied by Spalter-Roth, Soto, and Zandniapour (1994).
5.2 Control groups
In before-versus-after studies, outcomes for treatments before treatment provide
the counterfactual. In with-versus-without studies, outcomes for non-participants or
non-eligibles—control groups—provide the counterfactual.19
5.2.1 Principles
The ideal control group has the same joint distribution as the treatment group
for all traits—observed and unobserved—that affect the outcome. The closer the joint
distributions, the better the control group. If controls match treatments in all ways
except for treatment, then all differences in outcomes can be attributed to treatment.
5.2.1.1 Experiments
A good control group is hard to find. To avoid self-selection bias, controls must
lack choice about treatment. (Panel data or econometric models may also allow more
complex controls for self-selection [Reichart and Mark, 1998; Moffitt, 1991].) The gold
standard for exogeneity in treatment status is random assignment, either through
design or through nature (Manski, 1995; Meyer, 1995).
In a classic experiment, the evaluator excludes some eligibles (or qualified
applicants) at random. This purges self-selection bias because treatment is uncorrelated
with individual traits. UISED is the only classic experiment in microenterprise.
In a “natural” experiment, constraints outside the evaluation eliminate choice for
some potential treatments. For example, a metro area might straddle state borders,
with only one state providing its residents with access to microenterprise programs.
Natural experiments typically require more assumptions than classic experiments, for
example, that people do not switch states to take advantage of programs.20
Even with some type of experiment, impact evaluation is difficult (Heckman and
Smith, 1995). Severe threats to validity plague even medical trials, where evaluations
can affect thousands of lives and perhaps billions of dollars (Mason and Drummond,
1995). The most common weakness is the simple failure to make assumptions explicit.
5.2.1.2 Comparison groups
Comparison groups match treatments with non-treatments on a small set of
observed traits such as sex, location, and/or receipt of public assistance. Although both
groups have the same joint distribution for these traits, they may not have the same
joint distribution for other traits. Thus, comparison groups are an inexpensive (but
imperfect) substitute for experimental control groups. The only use of comparison
groups in microenterprise is Raheim and Alter (1998) and Sanders (2000). Comparison
groups are useful as long as the assumptions required to derive estimates of impact are
explicit. Otherwise, users may remain unaware that impact is likely overstated.
5.2.2 Practices
Himes and Servon (1998, p. 8) write that “the field desperately needs some
research that uses a control group.” Four factors help to explain why no major
evaluation except UISED has used control groups.
First, control-group evaluations are lengthy and expensive. Unfortunately,
donors, governments, and programs often seek quick evaluations, perhaps to support21
requests for the next tranche of funds. The high cost of rigorous evaluation means that
even the biggest funders can afford only a few evaluations. 
Second, some program staff believe that experiments are ethically wrong. After
all, programs were started precisely to combat the arbitrary injustice that random
assignment seems to perpetrate. This belief fails to consider that resources in
microenterprise might help the poor more in some other development intervention.
Third, some impacts elude quantification even with control groups. For example,
increased self-esteem may be the most important effect of participation (Raheim and
Alter, 1998; Spalter-Roth, Soto, and Zandniapour, 1994). Many effects are indeed too
complex, subtle, diffuse, or long-term to be quantified at low cost, but disciplined
arguments about qualitative judgements are still possible if based on ruthless logic and
explicit assumptions. Bates (1997 and 1996) critiques SEID not because the conclusions
are based on qualitative criteria but rather because the criteria are left unstated.
Fourth and most important, most evaluators have been advocates. Although
most were probably unaware of the weaknesses of their methods, few were disappointed
when impacts turned out to be large and positive.
The dirty secret in microenterprise (and elsewhere [Adams, 1988]) is that few
evaluations are really tests. Except perhaps for UISED, evaluations were funded and
conducted by people who already believed that microenterprise was worthwhile. Thus,
the projects are called “demonstrations”, not “tests”. They sought not to check whether22
microenterprise works but rather to convince funders and policymakers that it works.
Rigor is secondary to showing large impacts.
These are disturbing claims. Often, evaluators were simply unaware of the
weaknesses in their analyses. Sometimes, however, they were aware and chose
nonetheless to disseminate figures biased in favor of microenterprise. For example,
descriptions of the benefits from SEID are widely published, but the cost study—though
completed—is not yet available. Benus et al. (1995) were extremely rigorous in that
they estimated two sets of impacts for UISED, one including an outlier with income of
$500,000 a year and another excluding it. Subsequent discussion, however, tends to
focus on the (more positive) results that include the outlier. Likewise, UISED had two
sites, one with positive impacts and one with almost no impact. The policy derived
from the report (Vroman, 1997) focuses on the positive impacts. Finally, the SELP data
has some very large figures for changes in income and assets, likely due to misplaced
decimal points. Sanders (2000) says medians would be more appropriate measures (or
elimination or correction of outliers), but Kays et al. (1999) use means.
In short, evaluators did not always fix known biases. Some argue that there is a
prisoner’s dilemma in evaluation; greater rigor would destroy microenterprise’s chances
with policymakers against competing, non-rigorous proposals. Thus, challenges to the
evaluation of microenterprise probably mirror challenges to evaluation in general.
Policymakers, however, are not stupid, and they may grow to regard evaluation as little
more than social-science fiction.23
6. Discussion and recommendations
Is microenterprise a good way to help the poor? Three of the four major
evaluations say that it is. For SEID, Friedman et al. (1995, p. 16) say that
“proliferation of self-employment programs in the United States since (and because of)
SEID bodes well for the broad opening of a realistic self-employment option for welfare
recipients.” For SELP, Clark et al. (1999, p. 68) say that “microenterprise can offer an
effective entry point into the mainstream economy for the poor.” For UISED, Benus et
al. (1995, p. xi) say that “self-employment assistance is a cost-effective approach to
promote the rapid re-employment of unemployed workers and should be permanently
incorporated into the U.S. employment security and development system.”
This paper argues for more caution. It concurs with Servon and Bates (1998, p.
28) in that “the microenterprise strategy needs better evaluation”. Undoubtedly, impact
has been positive, and some participants have turned their lives around. The question
for public policy, however, is not whether some people benefit but whether the poor as a
whole are better off with microenterprise than with something else. Three
recommendations are offered to guide improvement: beware of backlash, reward rigor,
and compare outputs with costs.24
6.1 Beware of backlash
If microenterprise is worthwhile, then the case should stand up to rigorous
analysis. If it is too soon to judge, then evaluations should note this and then argue
from explicit assumptions how quickly the required improvement might occur.
In the long term, people will realize that microenterprise is not a panacea, and
the backlash may sting. Bates (1996, p. 28) says that “advocates put their cause at risk
when they substitute inflated claims and selective statistics for serious analysis.”
Microenterprise has benefits and costs, and experience abroad suggests that failure to
account for both sides can harm the poor in the long term (Adams et al., 1984).
Weak analysis can hurt in three ways. First, advocacy distracts effort from the
use of feedback to improve performance. Failure is often a better teacher than success.
Second, better measurement might improve work-a-day management. If managers do
not know how well they perform, then they are unlikely to try to improve. Third,
overstated claims may divert funds from projects that could help the poor more. The
goal is not more microenterprise but rather improved well-being for the poor.
Benus et al. (1995) is an ideal example of rigor. The thoroughness of the report
was such that a detailed critique (with different conclusions) was possible (Schreiner,
1999). Another excellent example is the financial benefit-cost analysis of Individual
Development Accounts (matched savings accounts for the poor that may be used to
capitalize microenterprise) by Clones et al. (1995). This analysis is uncommonly25
rigorous not because of its accurate measurement (all the numbers are pro forma) but
because it carefully enumerates different sources of benefits and costs for different
groups and then discusses which benefits and costs might be measured, which cannot
be measured, and what assumptions are used to arrive at estimates.
6.2 Reward rigor
Government officials and program officers for private funders are rewarded (with
promotions, with invitations to speak at conferences or to write prefaces, with feelings
of having done good) more for new, successful ideas than for failed experiments. In
turn, evaluators suppose that their own rewards (in future contracts) are greatest if a
project is deemed successful. Until the rewards for the people who fund and conduct
evaluations depend more on the rigor of the process than on the judgement itself, a
sanguine bias is inevitable. This does not impugn the motives or morals of funders or
evaluators; it merely recognizes explicitly that who pays the piper calls the tune.
The incentive structure should reward learning, not victory. Learning on such a
broad scale as a microenterprise movement, however, is extremely difficult to measure.
A focus on changes between interim evaluations might provide some incentives in early
evaluations to highlight weaknesses that could be resolved before later evaluations.
Funders might also explicitly forbid emotional appeals (for example, photographs
of entrepreneurs in reports). Qualitative investigation can convey ideas that nothing
else can, but evidence should trump emotion. What matters are not the faces of specific26
cases but rather the faceless millions who will get the benefits (or bear the costs) if
funds are correctly or incorrectly allocated to microenterprise.
Evaluators might receive fixed contracts for x jobs and then no more. Like lame-
duck presidents, they might be more willing to say whether the emperor has no clothes.
Finally, funders could link rewards for program officers to blind reviews of
evaluations that seek to identify unacknowledged threats to validity or implicit
assumptions. This would reward evaluators who make caveats explicit.
6.3 Compare outputs with costs
Perhaps the simplest way to inform judgements of the performance of
microenterprise programs is to compare outputs with costs. Like any shopper, funders
should know the price tag.
It is less expensive to compare outputs with costs than to compare benefits with
costs. Of course, it is also less informative; the analyst must still judge whether the
unmeasured benefits associated with outputs could reasonably exceed costs. Still, “cost
calculations can provide a useful ‘reality check.’ . . . Whatever the true size of external
benefits, the [funder] must judge that at a minimum the external benefit exceeds this
cost for the intervention to be worth undertaking (Devarajan et al., 1997, p. 40).”
Comparing outputs with costs forces analysts to make their judgements explicit.
A good example is Edgcomb et al. (1996); they argue that their estimated cost of $6,00027
per participant is “close” to that of federal job programs ($3,500 per participant)
because microenterprise participants are poorer.
Likewise, Edgcomb et al. (1996) estimate that a dollar-year of debt produced in
SELP cost $1.47. If social gains are to exceed social costs, then borrowers must get at
least $1.47 of surplus per dollar-year of debt.
Schreiner and Morduch (2001) use data from Severens and Kays (1997) and from
Langer, Orwick, and Kays (1999) to compute an average cost per participant for U.S.
programs of about $2,000 in 1996 and $1,300 in 1999. Raheim (1997) also mentions a
cost per participant of about $2,000 for SEID. Of course, cost estimates alone do not
reveal whether microenterprise is worthwhile, but evaluators might start to ask whether
benefits per participant are likely to exceed $2,000.
Servon and Doshna (2000) compare costs per job created across several
interventions. (It is not clear whether “jobs” are full-time equivalents nor whether they
are truly impacts of the interventions.) In three microenterprise programs, costs per job
ranged from $4,000 to $6,000. In industrial recruitment, costs per job were between
$2,000 and $10,000 in one study and between $11,000 to $50,000 in another study.
Costs per job were $1,500 to $2,000 in business incubators, $5,000 in a public-works
program, and $3,000 to $5,000 in revolving loan funds. Servon and Doshna (p. 191)
conclude that “on this measure, microenterprise development is well within the scope of
other economic-development strategies.”28
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